UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/855,989	05/15/2001	Edward D. Brill	2206.64630	9366
24978 GREER, BURN	7590 10/31/200 IS & CRAIN	8	EXAM	IINER
300 S WACKE			PRONE,	JASON D
25TH FLOOR CHICAGO, IL	60606		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3724	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			10/31/2008	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

1	UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
2	
3	
4	BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
5	AND INTERFERENCES
6	
7	E CENTADO DE DELLA ADICIAL HADDEN
8 9	Ex parte EDWARD D. BRILL and RICK L. HABBEN
10	
11	Appeal 2008-4093
12	Application 09/855,989
13	Technology Center 3700
14	
15	
16	Decided: October 31, 2008
17	
18	
19	Before WILLIAM F. PATE, III, JENNIFER D. BAHR and DANIEL S.
20	SONG, Administrative Patent Judges.
21	CONC. A lucinization Descent Lucia
22	SONG, Administrative Patent Judge.
23	
24	DECISION ON APPEAL
25	
26	STATEMENT OF THE CASE
27	The Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2002) from rejection of
28	claims 1-14 and 17-21. Claims 15, 16 and 22 stand withdrawn from
29	consideration. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002).
30	The Appellants claim a vibrator motor that can be used in a hair
31	clipper.

1	Representative ind	lependent claim 1 reads as	follows:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	a stati a mov moving piec interlocking piece lamina stationary p	rator motor comprising: ionary piece having a plur- ying piece having a plurali- te being hingedly secured the moving piece laminat- ations so that the moving piece laminations form a hi- te laminations to the statio	ty of laminations, the to the stationary piece by ions with the stationary piece laminations and nge which secures the
11	Independent claim	17 is directed to a hair cli	pper having a motor with
12	the components recited in	n independent claim 1.	
13	The prior art relied	l upon by the Examiner in	rejecting the claims is:
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Davis Pfenning Huppert Wahl Soultanian Kienzler	3,357,101 3,735,297 5,771,538 5,787,587 6,163,092 WO 00/27599	Dec. 12, 1967 May 22, 1973 Jun. 30, 1998 Aug. 4, 1998 Dec. 19, 2000 May 18, 2000
21	The Examiner reje	cted claims 1-4, 7-9 and 1	1-13 under 35 U.S.C.
22	§ 103(a) as unpatentable	over Soultanian and Pfeni	ning.
23	The Examiner reje	ected claims 5 and 6 under	35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
24	unpatentable over Soulta	nian, Pfenning and Kienzl	er.
25	The Examiner reje	ected claim 10 under 35 U.	S.C. § 103(a) as
26	unpatentable over Soulta	nian, Pfenning and Davis.	
27	The Examiner reje	ected claim 14 under 35 U.	S.C. § 103(a) as
28	unpatentable over Soulta	nian, Pfenning and Huppe	rt.

1	The Examiner rejected claims 17, 18 and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
2	as unpatentable over Soultanian, Wahl and Pfenning.
3	The Examiner rejected claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
4	unpatentable over Soultanian, Wahl, Pfenning and Kienzler.
5	We AFFIRM.
6	
7	ISSUE
8	The dispositive issue in the present appeal is whether the Appellants
9	have shown that the Examiner erred in relying on Pfenning, and thus, erred
10	in rejecting the appealed claims based on Pfenning in combination with
11	other prior art references of record.
12	
13	FINDINGS OF FACT
14	The record supports the following findings of fact (FF) by a
15	preponderance of the evidence.
16	1. Soultanian describes a vibrator motor including a stationary
17	piece (stator 10) having a plurality of laminations (38) and a moving piece
18	(armature 12) having a plurality of laminations (40), where the moving piece
19	is hingedly secured to the stationary piece (col. 3, 11. 40-44; figs. 1-5).
20	2. The motor of Soultanian does not describe interlocking the
21	moving piece laminations and the stationary piece laminations so that the
22	laminations form a hinge that secures the moving piece laminations to the
23	stationary piece laminations. Instead, the motor of Soultanian utilizes a
24	housing member (30), a pivot (20) and a spacing member (48) to hinge the

24

1 stationary piece and the moving piece together (col. 3, 11, 44-50 and 56-61; 2 figs. 1-3). 3 3. Pfenning describes a relay where moving piece laminations 4 (movable armature 16) are hingedly secured to the stationary piece 5 laminations (magnet frame 10) via extension (17) and bore (18) to thereby 6 form a hinge (col. 2, 1. 50-col. 3, 1. 1; col. 3, 11. 11-15; fig. 1). 7 8 PRINCIPLES OF LAW 9 "Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences 10 between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such 11 that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 12 invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 13 subject matter pertains." KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 14 1734 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the 15 16 prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the 17 prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called 18 secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).19 20 In KSR, the Supreme Court emphasized "the need for caution in 21 granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior 22 art," and reaffirmed principles based on its precedent that "[t]he combination 23 of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious

when it does no more than yield predictable results." KSR, 127 S.Ct. at

1	1739. The Court also explained that "when a patent claims a structure
2	already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one
3	element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than
4	yield a predictable result." <i>Id.</i> at 1739-40.
5	The Court further stated that:
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, §103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.
18	<i>Id.</i> at 1740.
19	The Court noted that "[t]o facilitate review, this analysis should be
20	made explicit." <i>Id.</i> at 1741 (citing <i>In re Kahn</i> , 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
21	2006) ("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
22	conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning
23	with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
24	obviousness")). However, "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
25	directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
26	can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
27	ordinary skill in the art would employ." KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1741.

I	
2	ANALYSIS
3	Initially, the Appellants state that the ground of rejection to be
4	reviewed on appeal is whether independent claim 1 would have been
5	obvious over Soultanian and Pfenning, and more particularly, whether
6	Pfenning is an analogous prior art reference (App. Br. 11). The Appellants
7	further state that dependent claims 2-14, independent claim 17 and
8	dependent claims 18-21 stand or fall together (App. Br. 11). The Appellants
9	do not make any separate arguments in favor of independent claim 17, or
10	dependent claims 2-14 and 18-21, apart from claim 1.
11	The Examiner rejected claim 1 stating that Soultanian describes all of
12	the limitations recited in claim 1 except for the limitation "the moving piece
13	laminations and the stationary piece laminations form a hinge which secures
14	the moving piece laminations to the stationary piece laminations" (Ans. 3
15	and 4). The Examiner relies on Pfenning to cure this deficiency stating that
16	it would have been obvious to provide the motor of Soultanian with the
17	hinge of Pfenning (Ans. 4).
18	The Appellants first contend that the Examiner erred in finding that
19	Soultanian describes the recited interlocking of the moving piece
20	laminations and the stationary piece laminations (App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 2).
21	Secondly, the Appellants contend that Pfenning is not an analogous
22	reference because it describes a relay instead of a vibrator motor claim 1
23	(App. Br. 14). Moreover, the Appellants also contend that there is no
24	motivation or suggestion to combine Soultanian and Pfenning (App. Br. 16).

1	Firstly, the Appellants' argument that Soultanian does not describe the
2	limitation "interlocking the moving piece laminations with the stationary
3	piece lamination" is unpersuasive. During prosecution, claims are to be
4	given their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification as it
5	would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
6	Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Moreover, "[a]bsent
7	claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the
8	claim based on the specification or prosecution history when those sources
9	expressly disclaim the broader definition." <i>In re Bigio</i> , 381 F.3d 1320, 1325
10	(Fed Cir. 2004).
11	The term "interlock" is defined, inter alia, as "to connect so that the
12	motion or operation of any part is constrained by another." Marriam-
13	Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11 th Ed. (2007). There does not appear to
14	be a specific definition of "interlock" or "interlocking", or a disclaimer
15	within the Specification of such a broad definition. Thus, when the broad
16	construction of "interlocking" is applied, we find that connection of the
17	moving piece laminations with the stationary piece laminations using
18	additional components (such as a housing member (30), a pivot (20) and a
19	spacing member (48) (FF 2)) as described in Soultanian satisfies the recited
20	interlocking limitation of independent claim 1.
21	Moreover, even accepting, arguendo, that Soultanian does not
22	describe the recited interlocking of the moving piece and the stationary
23	piece, the outcome of the present appeal is not impacted because Pfenning
24	clearly describes this limitation as well (FF 3), and we find that the

1 Examiner properly relied upon Pfenning in rejecting claim 1 as discussed 2 infra. 3 The Appellants' contentions that Pfenning is not an analogous 4 reference and that the Examiner erred in relying on Pfenning are based on 5 the fact that Pfenning describes a relay instead of a motor (App. Br. 14 and 6 15). In this regard, the Appellants point out that vibrator motors and relays 7 are classified in different classes by the USPTO (App. Br. 14). The 8 Appellants also argue that a relay is unlike a motor because a relay does not 9 drive a workload or operate continuously like a motor, but instead, merely 10 makes and breaks electrical contact in response to command signals (App. 11 Br. 14; Reply Br. 2). In this regard, the Appellants contend that Pfenning 12 does not address the problem addressed by the claimed invention (App. Br. 13 15), and that even if Pfenning is an analogous reference, there is no 14 motivation or suggestion to combine Soultanian and Pfenning (App. Br. 16). 15 Even accepting, arguendo, that Pfenning is not within the same field 16 of endeavor because of differences between motors and relays, such a 17 finding does not preclude the Examiner from properly relying on Pfenning in 18 rejecting the Appellants' claims. In particular, the Supreme Court has held 19 that "[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives 20 and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field 21 or a different one." KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1740 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Federal Circuit has held that "[a] reference is reasonably pertinent if, 22 23 even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor's 24 endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals,

logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in 1 2 considering his problem." In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 3 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 4 In the present case, the difference between the Appellants' invention 5 of claim 1 and Soultanian is that the motor described in Soultanian has a hinge formed by a housing member (30), a pivot (20) and a spacing member 6 7 (48) (FF 1 and 2), instead of a hinge formed by the moving piece 8 laminations and the stationary piece laminations. However, the Examiner 9 finds this distinction to be obvious to one of ordinary skill because 10 "Soultanian and Pfenning incorporate very similar structure[s]" and "it is old 11 and well known for an apparatus including moving piece lamination being 12 pivotally hinged to stationary piece laminations to incorporate a hinge that is 13 formed by the moving and stationary pieces and not by an additional 14 structure" (Ans. 10). 15 We agree with the Examiner's findings and conclude that the 16 Appellants' invention of claim 1 merely applies the known technique of 17 incorporating hinge features into the laminate components (as shown in 18 Pfenning) to laminate components for a vibrator motor that is structurally 19 similar to a relay. See KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1740 (stating "if a technique has 20 been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art 21 would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, 22 using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or 23 her skill"). In the above regard, we also find that Pfenning is reasonably 24 pertinent because Pfenning commends itself to the attention of a person of

1 ordinary skill in the art who is considering how to hingedly secure moving 2 piece laminations to stationary piece laminations. See In re Icon Health and 3 Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1379-80. Therefore, in view of the above, we conclude 4 that the Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in relying on 5 Pfenning. 6 With regard to the Appellants' argument that there is no motivation or 7 suggestion to combine Soultanian and Pfenning (App. Br. 16), we note that 8 the Examiner "need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific 9 subject matter of the challenged claim." KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1741. What is 10 required is for the Examiner to provide "some articulated reasoning with 11 some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." 12 *Id.* In the present appeal, the Examiner articulated a reason for applying the 13 teachings of Pfenning to the hinge of Soultanian, namely, "to allow the 14 apparatus to incorporate less parts by substituting a hinge formed by the moving and stationary laminations instead of a third party hinge apparatus" 15 16 (Ans. 4). We find the Examiner's articulated reason to be rational and 17 sufficient for concluding that claim 1 would have been obvious to one of 18 ordinary skill in the art. See also Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher Price, 19 *Inc.*, 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[O]ne of ordinary skill in the 20 art . . . would have found it obvious to combine the Bevan device with the 21 SSR to update it using modern electronic components in order to gain the commonly understood benefits of such adaptation, such as decreased size, 22 23 increased reliability, simplified operation, and reduced cost.")

1	Therefore, in view of the above, we find that the Appellants have not
2	shown that the Examiner erred in relying on Pfenning, or that the Examiner
3	erred in rejecting claim 1 as unpatentable over Soultanian and Pfenning. As
4	the Appellants have not presented any separate arguments as to the
5	remaining claims on appeal, the Appellants likewise have not shown that the
6	Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2-14 and 17-21.
7	
8	CONCLUSION
9	On the record before us, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner
10	erred in relying on Pfenning, or that the Examiner erred in rejecting the
11	appealed claims.
12	
13	ORDER
14	The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-14 and 17-21 are AFFIRMED.
15	No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
16	this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. §
17	1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2007).
18	
19	<u>AFFIRMED</u>
20	ack
21	CC:
22 23	GREER, BURNS & CRAIN 300 S WACKER DR
24	25TH FLOOR
25	CHICAGO. IL 60606